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During the past two terms,' the Louisiana appellate courts rendered
a number of noteworthy decisions interpreting the Declaration of Rights
of the Louisiana Constitution of 1974, including significant contributions
to the law of procedural due process,2 freedom of speech,3 and freedom
of religion,4 as well as to the constitutional law of juvenile procedure5
Copyright 1990, by LOUISIANA LAW REVIW.
* Associate Professor of Law, Louisiana State University Law Center. I wish to
thank David Hilburn for his assistance in preparing this piece.
1. Since no discussion of Louisiana Constitutional Law was included in the last
"Developments" issue, this article considered decisions of both the 1988.1989 and the
1989-1990 terms.
2. In re Adoption of B.G.S., 556 So. 2d 545 (La. 1990), holding that provisions
of the Louisiana private adoption statute, which drastically limited the ability of an unwed
father to resist termination of his parental rights where the natural mother wished to
place the child for adoption, violated the father's state and federal constitutional rights
to procedural due process.
3. State v. Burgess, 543 So. 2d 1332 (La. 1989), holding that the state and federal
constitutional guarantees of freedom of speech precluded enforcement of former La. R.S.
18:1463(B) (Supp. 1990), which prohibited distribution of political campaign literature
alleging that particular candidates are affiliated with other candidates, and of former La.
R.S. 18:1463(C)(1) (Supp. 1990), which prohibited distribution of anonymous statements
containing "scurrilous, false, or irresponsible adverse comment" about candidates.
4. Babcock v. New Orleans Baptist Theological Seminary, 554 So. 2d 90 (La. App.
4th Cir. 1989), writ denied, 558 So. 2d 607 (1990), holding, over the dissent of Judge
Ciaccio, that neither the federal nor state constitutional guarantees of freedom of religion
precluded the courts from entertaining the claim of a seminarian that the seminary breached
its contractual commitment when it dismissed him without following its established pro-
cedures for imposing such discipline. See also, to similar effect, First Union Baptist Church
v. Banks, 533 So. 2d 1305, 1308 n.l (La. App. 3d Cir. 1988), indicating that the courts
had jurisdiction over an action challenging the authority of a church's purported board
of directors to remove the pastor of that church, at least where the action did not require
the court to inquire into the merits of any church discipline of that pastor.
5. State in Interest of Newton, 559 So. 2d 801 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1990) (holding
that even in the absence of express statutory authorization, courts have inherent power
to review juvenile proceedings for constitutional errors patent); State in Interest of Handy,
559 So. 2d 795 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1990) (same).
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and criminal procedure.6 Of these developments, two stand out 'as po-
tentially farthest-reaching in their effects: 1) the Louisiana Supreme
Court's recognition that the express guarantee of "privacy" in the state
constitution independently protects some matters of personal choice from
unjustified government interference;7 and 2) the continuing efforts of
the Louisiana courts to articulate and consistently apply the independent
analysis of the state constitution's guarantee of equality that was an-
nounced five years ago in Sibley v. Board of Supervisors of Louisiana
State University,8 and to differentiate that, analysis from the "tier"
approach used to analyze the cognate federal right to equal protection
of the laws. 9
6. In several of these decisions, the Louisiana courts have continued to demonstrate
their willingness to interpret state constitutional rights guarantees in a manner that is
informed by but independent of, and may grant rights beyond those guaranteed by, similar
provisions of the federal Bill of Rights. See, e.g., State v. Church, 538 So. 2d 993 (La.
1989) (holding that DWI roadblocks, though permissible under the search and seizure
provisions of the federal fourth amendment, nonetheless violate the more stringent re-
quirements of the state constitutional guarantee of privacy, La. Const. art. I, § 5); State
v. Spellman, 562 So. 2d 455 (La. 1990) (holding that La. Const. art. I, § 16 entitled a
prisoner to a reasonable continuance of trial so that he could appear before the jury in
his own civilian clothes); State v. Walland, 555 So. 2d 478 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1989)
(reviewing conflicting federal precedents and holding that La. Const. art. I, § 16 entitled
defendant to separate trial following trial of codefendant, where codefendant offered to
testify on behalf of defendant if, but only if, codefendant was tried first); State v. Golden,
546 So. 2d 501 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1989) (unlike federal eighth amendment, La. Const.
art. I, § 18 precluded court from limiting bail to "cash only"). The Louisiana courts'
willingness to move beyond cognate federal law is not confined to the area of criminal
rights. See, for example, the discussion at notes 56-61, infra. Nor is such willingness to
move beyond federal models unique to Louisiana. On the contrary, it places Louisiana
firmly within the mainstream of the "new federalism" in state constitutional interpretation.
See generally, Williams, In the Supreme Court's Shadow: Legitimacy of State Rejection
of Supreme Court Reasoning and Result, 35 S.C.L. Rev. 353 (1984); Collins & Galie,
Models of Post-Incorporation Judicial Review: 1985 Survey of State Constitutional In-
dividual Rights Decisions, 55 U. Cin. L. Rev. 317, 325 (1986).
In other cases involving criminal rights, the Louisiana courts have continued to explore
the nuances of search and seizure law under both the federal and state constitutions. See,
e.g., State v. Honeyman, 560 So. 2d 825 (La. 1990) (where the state does not rely on
a statutory presumption of intoxication, results of a blood alcohol test will be admissable
as evidence so long as state shows that the test is sufficiently reliable to satisfy the
requirements of due process; distinguishing the higher standard of reliability required where
the state relies on such a test to establish the statutory presumption); In re Mullins &
Pritchard, Inc., 549 So. 2d 872 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1989) (oil production facilities fall
under the "pervasively regulated industry" exception to the warrant requirement for
administrative searches); State v. Peters, 546 So. 2d 829 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1989) (placing
electronic beeper on car, by warrant, did not violate defendant's right to privacy).
7. Hondroulis v. Schuhmacher, 553 So. 2d 398, 415 (La. 1989), discussed infra at
notes 20-28, holding that "the Louisiana Constitution's right to privacy also provides for
a right to decide whether to obtain or reject medical treatment."
8. 477 So. 2d 1094 (La. 1985).
9. See infra text accompanying notes 56-85.
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Interpreting the State Constitutional Right of Privacy: Hondroulis v.
Schuhmacher and Beyond
"Privacy" is a word of many legal meanings. As a concept in
private law, the right of privacy is deeply rooted in the jurisprudence
of virtually all states, including Louisiana. ° As a concept in constitutional
law, in contrast, the right of privacy is far more recent in origin and
problematic in meaning. Its existence and nature were first recognized
and explored by federal courts interpreting the "penumbras" of certain
express federal rights and the implications of the general federal guar-
antee of "liberty," of which one cannot be deprived without due process
of law." The concept was thereafter adopted by some states into their
state constitutional jurisprudence, either by express state constitutional
amendment 2 or by state judicial interpretation of pre-existing generally
10. The Louisiana law of privacy in its sense as a private tort (or delict) has been
rooted both in Louisiana Civil Code article 2315 and in the guarantee of "privacy"
contained in The Louisiana Constitution of 1974, article I, § 5, which is set out at note
17 infra. In analyzing the parameters of the concept of privacy in this sense, the Louisiana
courts have "adopted, in wholesale fashion, the four branch analysis of Dean Prosser
and the Restatement (Second) of Torts." Easter Seal Society v. Playboy Enterprises, 530
So. 2d 643, 647 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1988) (citing Jaubert v. Crowley Post-Signal, Inc.,
375 So. 2d 1386, 1388-89 & n.2 (La. 1979)). See also, to like effect, Roshto v. Hebert,
439 So. 2d 428, 430 (La. 1983).
It is worthy of note that this year marks the 100 year anniversary of the seminal article
that originally conceptualized and articulated the right of privacy in this sense as a private
tort. Warren & Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 Harv. L. Rev. 193 (1890). For an
overview of the current jurisprudence see generally, W. Keeton, D. Dobbs, R. Keeton &
D. Owen, Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts at 849-69 (5th ed. 1984).
11. Though hints of things to come can be found in earlier decisions, the first clear
statement that such interests could rise to the level of constitutionally protected rights
can be found in Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 85 S. Ct. 1678 (1965) in which
the Court held that the federal Bill of Rights required invalidation of a Connecticut
statute which restricted the ability of a married couple to obtain and use contraceptives.
During the years following Griswold, the federal supreme court extended the autonomy
strand of its privacy analysis to further secure the right of an individual to read or watch
whatever he pleases within the privacy of her own home, to marry or refrain from
marriage, to choose to become or to refrain from becoming pregnant, and to choose
whether or not to continue a pregnancy already in progress. See, e.g., Thornburgh v.
American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747, 106 S. Ct. 2169
(1986); Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 98 S. Ct. 673 (1978); Carey v. Population
Services Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 97 S. Ct. 2010 (1977); Moore v. City of East Cleveland,
431 U.S. 494, 97 S. Ct. 1932 (1977); Cleveland Board of Education v. LaFleur, 414 U.S.
632, 94 S. Ct. 791 (1974); United States Department of Agriculture v. Moreno, 413 U.S.
528, 535 n.7, 93 S. Ct. 2821, 2826 n.7 (1973); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 93 S. Ct.
705 (1973); Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 93 S. Ct. 739 (1973); Stanley v. Georgia, 394
U.S. 557, 89 S. Ct. 1243 (1969).
12. Between 1968 and 1980, eight states amended their respective state constitutions
to provide explicit protection for a right of "privacy." These amendments took several
1990]
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worded state guarantees." As it has developed over the last twenty-five
years, the right of privacy in its constitutional sense has generally been
conceived as potentially protecting three related but distinguishable types
of interests: the right to be free of unreasonable surveillance and intrusion
("search and seizure" rights);' 4 the right to prevent the accumulation
forms. The initial approach, adopted by four states-Hawaii, Illinois, South Carolina &
Louisiana-simply added language prohibiting "unreasonable ... invasions of privacy"
to each state's respective guarantee of freedom from unreasonable searches and seizures.
Haw. Const. art. I, § 7; Ill. Const. art. I, § 6; S.C. Const. art. I, § 10; La. Const. art.
I, § 5. California pursued a unique approach, adding "privacy" to the list of fundamental
rights declared to be basic and inalienable. Cal. Const. art. I, § 1. The final approach,
also adopted by four states-Montana, Alaska, Hawaii (acting for a second time) and
Florida-involved the enactment of wholly new, free standing sections of the states'
respective declarations of rights, each of which was phrased differently from the others
but all of which explicitly protected some right of "privacy." Mont. Const. art. II, §
10; Alaska Const. art. I, § 22; Haw. Const. art. I, § 6; Fla. Const. art. I, § 23.
13. In a process that began in the early 1970's and is still underway, courts in several
states, including New Jersey, Massachusetts, Minnesota and Connecticut, followed the
lead of Griswold and its progeny and concluded that various broadly phrased provisions
of their respective state declarations of rights also should be construed to provide protection
for the right of individuals to make a wide range of basic decisions regarding their personal
and family lives free from governmental coercion or interference. See Doe v. Maher, 40
Conn. Supp. 394, 418-40, 515 A.2d 134, 146-57 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1986). Brophy v. New
England Sinai Hospital, Inc., 398 Mass. 417, 429-30, 497 N.E.2d 626, 632-33 (1986); Moe
v. Secretary of Administration and Finance, 382 Mass. 629, 645-59, 417 N.E.2d 387, 397-
404 (1981); Jarvis v. Levine, 418 N.W.2d 139, 146-48 (Minn. 1988); State v. Gray, 413
N.W.2d 107 (Minn. 1987); In re Farrell, 108 N.J. 335, 529 A.2d 404 (1987); In re Conroy,
98 N.J. 321, 486 A.2d 1209 (1985); State v. Baker, 81 N.J. 99, 112-13, 405 A.2d 368,
374 (1979); State v. Saunders, 75 N.J. 200, 216-17, 381 A.2d 333, 341 (1977); State v.
Ciuffini, 164 N.J. Super. 145, 395 A.2d 904 (N.J. Super Ct. App. Div. 1978).
14. The concept of constitutional privacy in this sense, as a shield against surveillance
and intrusion, is enshrined in the federal fourth amendment and was first articulated long
ago. See, Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478, 48 S. Ct. 564, 572 (1928)
(Brandeis, J., dissenting from the Court's decision upholding the constitutionality of a
wiretap, and arguing that the federal constitution protects a fundamental "right to be let
alone" by the government); Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630, 6 S. Ct. 524, 532.
(1886) (noting that the federal fourth and fifth amendments operate to protect "the
privacies of life").
In its modern incarnation the right of privacy in this sense appears to have two branches.
One, dating from Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 564-65, 89 S. Ct. 1243, 1247-48
(1969), ascribes a special significance to the home as a place where government cannot
intrude without sufficient reason. A second branch dates from Katz v. United States, 389
U.S. 347, 88 S. Ct. 507 (1967), in which the Court held that federal fourth amendment
protections against unreasonable searches and seizures apply where, but only where, the
person has a "reasonable expectation of privacy" in the conduct of the particular activity
being observed or recorded. While the federal Supreme Court has continued to employ
the Katz test in fourth amendment cases, it has often taken a very narrow view of whether
an asserted "expectation" of privacy is in fact "reasonable". See, e.g., Smith v. Maryland,
'442 U.S. 735, 99 S. Ct. 2577 (1979) (no reasonable expectation of privacy in the telephone
numbers one dials); United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 96 S. Ct. 1619 (1976) (no
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and dissemination of certain kinds of information about oneself ("dis-
closural" rights); 5 and the right to make certain choices about one's
personal or family life free of governmental coercion ("autonomy"
rights). 1 6
Louisiana is- one of the minority of states that has adopted an
express guarantee of "privacy" into its state constitution. Article 1,
section 5 of the Louisiana Constitution of 1974 states that "[e]very
person shall be secure ... against unreasonable ... invasions of pri-
vacy.' ' 7 While the existence of a state constitutional right to privacy is
thus beyond dispute, the question of how that right is to be interpreted
has been less certain. The state guarantee of privacy has long been
understood independently to protect individuals from unreasonable sur-
reasonable expectation of privacy in banking records); United States v. White, 401 U.S.
745, 91 S. Ct. 1122 (1971) (no reasonable expectation that other party to a conversation
would not consent to secretly broadcast that conversation to others).
15. The constitutional right of privacy in this sense has been frequently asserted before
but never vindicated by the federal Supreme Court. See, e.g., Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S.
589, 97 S. Ct. 869 (1977) (upholding a statute requiring disclosure of medical information
about individuals but indicating that, in limited circumstances not present in that case,
the federal constitutional right of privacy might forbid such activity). See generally Peck,
Extending the Constitutional Right to Privacy in the New Technological Age, 12 Hofstra
L. Rev. 893, 907-08 (1984).
16. Privacy in this sense might include not only the sort of "family" and procreative
rights currently given protection under the federal constitution, see supra note 1l, infra
notes 35-38 and accompanying text, but also such matters as the asserted rights to engage
in consensual non-standard sexual activity, to control one's personal appearance or to
maintain a particular "lifestyle." While these other aspects of the right of privacy in its
autonomy sense have generally not received federal constitutional protection, see Bowers
v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 106 S. Ct. 2841 (1986) (no federal constitutional protection
for consensual homosexual sodomy); Kelley v. Johnson, 425 U.S. 238, 96 S. Ct. 1536
(1976) (no federal constitutional prohibition on school forcing students to cut their hair);
Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1, 94 S. Ct. 1536 (1974) (upholding a zoning
ordinance prohibiting more than two unrelated persons from sharing living quarters), they
are conceptually similar to those "autonomy" rights which do receive federal protection.
As is noted infra at notes 41-48, these additional aspects of the right of autonomy have
in some cases been given protection by state courts construing state constitutions.
17. La. Const. art. I, § 5 provides in full as follows:
§ 5. Right to Privacy
Section 5. Every person shall be secure in his person, property, communications,
houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches, seizures, or invasions
of privacy. No warrant shall issue without probable cause supported by oath
or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, the persons
or things to be seized, and the lawful purpose or reason for the search. Any
person adversely affected by the search or seizure conducted in violation of this
Section shall have standing to raise its illegality in the appropriate court.
This provision was adopted by the Louisiana Constitutional Convention of 1973 on January
19, 1974. The proposed new constitution, including this language, was ratified by the
voters on April 20, 1974:
1990]
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veillance and intrusion" as well as from unjustified disclosure of private
information.' 9 Until last term, however, no Louisiana case had squarely
held that the state constitutional guarantee of privacy also independently
protects "autonomy" rights-that is, the fundamental right of individuals
to make certain decisions regarding their family and personal lives free
from governmental interference, unless that interference can be justified
as necessary to promote a compelling state interest.
In Hondroulis v. Schuhmacher,1" the Louisiana Supreme Court took
the significant step of squarely holding, for the first time, that the state
right of privacy includes and independently protects at least some "au-
tonomy" rights.2' The case was not one which would appear on its face
to have been a likely candidate to raise important constitutional issues.
It involved an ordinary medical malpractice claim brought by a patient
who had suffered significant injury during a lumbar laminectomy. Plain-
tiff claimed that she was unaware of the risks of the surgery and would
not have consented if she had known. Defendant moved for summary
judgment on the ground that the plaintiff had signed a consent form
which tracked the statutory requirements of Louisiana Revised Statutes
40:1229.40 by describing broad categories of injury that might result
from medical treatments generally. 22 The trial court granted defendant's
motion for summary judgment and the court of appeal affirmed, holding
that a validly procured patient signature on a consent form tracking
the language of Louisiana Revised Statutes 40:1229.40 establishes a heavy
presumption of informed consent, which plaintiff had failed to rebut.23
On its first hearing of the case, the Louisiana Supreme Court also
affirmed. 24
On rehearing, however, the state supreme court reversed, holding
that "the decision to obtain or reject medical treatment" falls within
a cluster of personal choices protected from unjustified government
interference both implicitly by the federal Constitution and explicitly by
the state constitution. 21 In the court's words:
Art. I, Section 5 of the 1974 Louisiana Constitution expressly
guarantees that every person shall be secure in his person against
18. See, e.g., State v. Hernandez, 410 So. 2d 1381 (La. 1982); Parish National Bank
v. Lane, 397 So. 2d 1282 (La. 1981).
19. See, e.g., Trahan v. Larivee, 365 So. 2d 294, 300 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1978).
20. 553 So. 2d 398 (La. 1989). The case is noted, and the non-constitutional aspects
of the decision are discussed, at Note, Hondroulis v. Schuhmacher: The Crusade Back
to Canterbury, 50 La. L. Rev. 1195 (1990).
21. 533 So. 2d at 414-15.
22. Id. at 410-11.
23. Hondroulis v. Schuhmacher, 521 So. 2d 534 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1988).
24. Hondroulis v. Schuhmacher, 531 So. '2d 450 (La. 1988), rev'd 553 So. 2d 398
(La. 1989).
25. Hondroulis v. Schuhmacher, 553 So. 2d 398, 414 (La.. 1989).
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unreasonable "invasions of privacy." This safeguard was in-
tended to establish an affirmative right to privacy impacting
non-criminal areas of law and establishing the principles of
Supreme Court decisions [construing the federal Constitution to
protect autonomy rights] in explicit statement instead of de-
pending on analogical development. Accordingly, we conclude
that the Louisiana Constitution's right to privacy also provides
for a right to decide whether to obtain or reject medical treat-
ment. (Citations omitted.)16
Turning to Louisiana Revised Statutes 40:1229.40, the court held that
the Louisiana informed consent statute, as interpreted by the court of
appeal, violated this constitutional standard because it encouraged phy-
sicians "merely to present patients with a form copying the phraseology
of the statute, rather than to fully inform each patient in layman's
terms of the nature and severity of the particular material risks to be
encountered in her case," and because that diminution of a patient's
ability effectively and intelligently to control her own medical treatment
served no compelling government interest. 27 In order to avoid consti-
tutional infirmity, the court construed Louisiana Revised Statutes
40:1229.40 to create a rebuttable presumption of "consent" but no
presumption of "informed consent," and, accordingly, reversed the grant
of summary judgment to the doctor defendant. 28
The conclusion of the Hondroulis court that the state constitution's
reference to "privacy" should be construed to include protection for
"autonomy" rights of the kind recognized under the federal constitution
appears well founded. The placement of the guarantee of privacy within
section 5 of the state Declaration of Rights-a section which largely
parallels the federal fourth amendment in restricting the state govern-
ment's search and seizure authority-could be taken to indicate that the
rights it protects are relatively narrow in scope.2 9 However, while the
drafting history of the section is not completely clear, it does indicate
that the crucial language was also intended to incorporate and protect
disclosural and autonomy interests. The relevant language was drafted
by the Committee on Bill of Rights and Elections of the Louisiana
Constitutional Convention of 1973, working from proposals submitted
by various interested parties. Some proposals, such as a draft Bill of
26. Id. at 415.
27. Id. at. 416.
28. Id. at 417-22.
29. But see Hargrave, The Declaration of Rights of the Louisiana Constitution of
1974, 35 La. L. Rev. 1, 21 (1974), noting that section 5 as a whole was "deliberately
placed apart from the other criminal procedure guarantees which are grouped together in
Sections 13 through 21" in order to make evident that the rights it grants extend beyond
mere matters of search and seizure.
19901
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Rights submitted by delegate Weiss, included a separate freestanding
guarantee of "privacy" which would have provided explicit protection
for autonomy interests.30 Other proposals omitted any reference to pri-
vacy and would have apparently protected citizens only against unrea-
sonable searches and seizures.3" The final language appears to have been
a compromise between these competing drafts, intended to incorporate
the substance of the broader proposals without the need for a separate
freestanding "privacy" section. 2
The issue of the substantive scope of the right of privacy was not
discussed during the convention's plenary debate on this section33 and
was also apparently not extensively debated during the ratification cam-
paign. There is thus no direct evidence of what the framers and ratifiers
might have subjectively intended by that language. However, the state
supreme court has, on other occasions, resolved difficult issues of con-
stitutional interpretation by treating the crucial language in the document
as "a term of art or technical term" which must be "interpreted ac-
cording to its received meaning and acceptation with those learned in
the field ... . -34 By 1974, "privacy" had certainly become a "term of
art" in the field of constitutional law, -and its application to autonomy
rights and disclosural rights had long since been well established. Given
the notoriety accorded such federal "privacy" cases as Griswold v.
Connecticut,35 Loving v. Virginiaa6 Stanley v. Georgia7 and Roe v.
30. The proposal of Dr. Weiss provided at section 5(A) that "Everyone has the right
to privacy. No law shall authorize arbitrary or abusive interference with one's private
life, family, home or communications." 10 Records of the Louisiana Constitutional
Convention of 1973: Committee Documents 100-01 (1977). See also, to the same effect,
id. at 7 (testimony of Dr. Francine Merritt and Ms. Debra Millenson).
31. See, e.g., the proposal of delegate Jenkins. Id. at 101.
32. See generally Hargrave, supra note 29, at 20-22.
33. The bulk of the Convention debate on section 5 focused instead on two questions:
who would have standing to assert that a particular search was conducted in violation
of the section's terms; and whether it created a civil right of action against law enforcement
personnel who conduct illegal searches and seizures. 6 Records of the Louisiana Consti-
tutional Convention of 1973: Convention Transcripts 1072-77 (1977).
34. State Bond Commission v. All Taxpayers, 510 So. 2d 662, 665 (La. 1987) (citing
La. Civ. Code art. 15).
35. 381 U.S. 479, 85 S. Ct. 1678 (1965), holding that the implied federal right of
privacy precluded a state from unreasonably interfering with the ability of married couples
to obtain birth control.
36. 388 U.S. 1, 12, 87 S. Ct. 1817, 1824 (1967), relying on a privacy-based right of
untrammeled choice as to one's marriage partner as additional support for the Court's
decision striking down anti-miscegenation laws.
37. 394 U.S. 557, 564-65, 89 S. Ct. 1243, 1247-48 (1969), holding on both first
amendment and privacy grounds that states may not criminalize mere possession of allegedly
obscene material in the privacy of one's own home.
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Wade,3 8 all of which had been decided and published before section 5
was drafted, adopted and ratified, the presumption that the drafters
and ratifiers of the state constitution were aware of the possible import
of including an explicit right of "privacy" in the state constitution seems
eminently reasonable. 9
The holding of Hondroulis that the state constitution provides in-
dependent protection for at least some sorts of autonomy interests will
likely produce much future litigation, as the Louisiana courts will be
required to decide what other similar autonomy interests, in addition
to the right to determine one's own medical treatment, are also included
in the state constitutional right of "privacy." Recent decisions of the
United States Supreme Court that may signal a narrowing of the def-
inition and level of protection to be given privacy rights under the
federal Constitution4° have both reemphasized the importance of cognate
state guarantees as alternative sources of protection for such fundamental
interests and provided litigants with a strong incentive to press their
state constitutional claims. Potential candidates for inclusion within the
concept of privacy in the autonomy sense that have been recognized as
38. 410 U.s. 113, 93 S. Ct. 705 (1973), holding that the federally protected right of
privacy in the "autonomy" sense required invalidation of state statutes which placed
unreasonable restraints on the ability of a pregnant adult to obtain an abortion.
39. Though I have elsewhere criticized the Louisiana courts' use of this rather me-
chanical approach to constitutional interpretation in cases where the drafters were in fact
unlikely to have been consciously aware of the supposed "technical" meaning of the
words they chose, Devlin, Developments in the Law, 1986-1987, Louisiana Constitutional
Law, 48 La. L. Rev. 335, 348-54 (1987), the argument has validity in situations such as
this, where the drafters were much more likely to have understood the import of the
language they chose.
To be sure, the court in Hondroulis did not explicitly rely on this rule of interpretation
in reaching its conclusion that section 5 protects autonomy rights. Neither did that court
explicitly distinguish, for purposes of determining the scope given such rights under federal
law, between federal decisions which preceded and those which post-dated the 1973
constitutional convention. However, the court's reliance on such a process of reasoning
is no less proper for being implicit, and it does remain that sufficient pre-convention
federal precedents already existed by 1974 to make it plain to all that a constitutional
right of "privacy" could well include affirmative rights of this sort. See generally Devlin,
State Constitutional Autonomy Rights in an Age of Federal Retrenchment: Some Thoughts
on the Interpretation of State Rights Derived From Federal Sources, 3 Emerging Issues
St. Const. Law 195 (1990).
40. See Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dept. of Health, 110 S. Ct. 2841 (1990) (holding
that a state's interest in the continued life of a permanently comatose patient can override
her parents' right to act on her behalf to stop life support, at least in the absence of
clear evidence that the patient would choose to die under those circumstances); Webster
v. Reproductive Health Services, 109 S. Ct. 3040 (1989) (permitting significant procedural
restrictions on the ability of pregnant women to obtain abortions); Bowers v. Hardwick,
478 U.S. 186, 106 S. Ct. 2841 (1986) (holding that the federal Constitution provides no
privacy based protection for homosexual acts between consenting adults).
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explicitly or implicitly protected by the constitutions of other states-
protected independently of and to a greater extent than such rights are
protected by the federal Constitution-include the rights of individuals
to control their personal appearance, 4' to refuse nutrition, 42 psychological
treatments, 43 or potentially life-prolonging medical treatments, 4 to live
with whom and in the manner they wish, 45 to possess controlled items
or substances in the privacy of their own homes," to engage in consensual
sexual activity with other adults, 47 and to choose whether or not to
obtain an abortion. 41 Which, if any, of these other types of autonomy
41. See, e.g., Friedman v. District Court, 611 P.2d 77, 78 (Alaska 1980) (judge can
regulate the dress of attorneys before him to some extent, but "cannot adopt a dress
code which is unduly rigid or which attempts to dictate matters of taste and esthetic
preference" without violating state constitutional right of privacy); Breese v. Smith, 501
P.2d 159 (Alaska 1972) (interpreting state constitutional right of privacy to strike down
school regulations limiting the length of male students' hair).
42. Corbett v. D'Alessandro, 487 So. 2d 368 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1986), review
denied, 492 So. 2d 1331 (Fla. 1986).
43. Jarvis v. Levine, 418 N.W.2d 139, 146-48 (Minn. 1988) (right of privacy gives
involuntarily committed mental patient the right to resist administration of neuroleptic
drugs; a hearing with procedural rights required before those rights can be overridden).
44. See Rasmussen by Mitchell v. Fleming, 154 Ariz. 207, 215, 741 P.2d 674, 682
(1987) (en banc); Satz v. Perlmutter, 379 So. 2d 359 (Fla. 1980), affirming, on the opinion
below, Satz v. Perlmutter, 362 So. 2d 160 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1978); In re Guardianship
of Barry, 445 So. 2d 365 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1984); Brophy v. New England Sinai
Hospital, Inc., 398 Mass. 417, 429-30, 497 N.E.2d 626, 632-33 (1986); In re Farrell, 108
N.J. 335, 529 A.2d 404 (1987); In re Conroy, 98 N.J. 321, 486 A.2d 1209 (1985).
45. See -Robbins v. Superior Court, 38 Cal. 3d 199, 695 P.2d 695, 211 Cal. Rptr.
398 (1985) (right of welfare recipients to live in own homes); City of Santa Barbara v.
Adamson, 27 Cal. 3d 123, 129-31, 610 P.2d 436, 439-40, 164 Cal. Rptr. 539, 542-43
(1980) (rejecting federal precedents and striking down zoning ordinances banning households
containing unrelated persons); State v. Baker, 81 N.J. 99, 112, 405 A.2d 368, 374 (1979).
46. See Ravin v. State, 537 P.2d 494, 500-11 (Alaska 1975) (state constitution precludes
criminalization of mere possession of marijuana for personal use within the confines of
one's home); State v. Kam, 69 Haw. 483, 490-96, 748 P.2d 372, 377-80 (1988) (finding
state constitutional protection for in-home possession of pornography). But see State v.
Harlan, 556 So. 2d 256 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1990), reaffirming prior holdings to the effect
that the Louisiana constitutional right of privacy does not embrace any right to consume
marijuana, even within the confines of one's own home.
47. See State v. Gray, 413 N.W.2d 107 (Minn. 1987) (indicating that state sodomy
statute may violate state constitutional right of privacy if applied to consenting adults
acting in private; rejecting federal Bowers analysis and result); State v. Saunders, 75 N.J.
200, 216-17, 381 A.2d 333, 341 (1977) (relying on both federal and state constitution to
strike down statute criminalizing consensual heterosexual activity between unmarried adults);
State v. Ciuffini, 164 N.J. Super. 145, 395 A.2d 904 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1978)
(state constitutional right of privacy precludes criminalization of homosexual activity
between consenting adults).
48. See Committee to Defend Reproductive Rights v. Myers, 29 Cal. 3d 252, 625
P.2d 779, 172 Cal. Rptr. 866 (1981) (abortion funding rights); Doe v. Maher, 40 Conn.
Supp. 394, 418-40, 515 A. 2d 134, 146-57 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1986) (state constitution
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rights will also be found to be protected by the Louisiana constitution
remains for future determination.4 9
As this article goes to press, the Louisiana Supreme Court has just
rendered an opinion further interpreting the right of privacy granted by
section 5, and coming to two conclusions that may be of enormous
future importance. In Moresi v. State of Louisiana, Department of
Wildlife and Fisheries,5 0 the court both: 1) indicated for the first time
that the protections of section 5 "go beyond limiting state action" and
apply directly to limit invasions of privacy interests by private, non-
governmental parties;" and 2) squarely held, also for the first time, that
a violation of section 5 may give rise to a private cause of action for
damages, similar to actions of the sort recognized under the federal
Constitution in the famous Bivens case.5 2 These conclusions will signif-
icantly expand the practical ability of Louisianians to resist invasions
of their privacy interests. For example, Moresi appears to cast doubt
upon the substantive results of cases such as Ballaron v. Equitable
contains an independent unexpressed right of privacy which was violated by refusal of
state authorities to fund abortions for indigent women); In Re T.W., 551 So. 2d 1186
(Fla. 1989) (striking down a statute requiring parental consent to a minor's abortion on
the basis of the state constitution's express guarantee of privacy). See also, to somewhat
similar effect, Conservatorship of Valerie N. v. Valerie N., 40 Cal. 3d 143, 707 P.2d
760, 219 Cal. Rptr. 387 (1985) (striking down statute absolutely forbidding sterilization
of retardates); Family Life League v. Department of Public Aid, 112 I1. 2d 449, 454,
493 N.E.2d 1054, 1057 (1986) (announcing that state provision incorporates some rights
of the type recognized in Griswold and Roe); Moe v. Secretary of Administration and
Finance, 382 Mass. 629, 645-59, 417 N.E.2d 387, 397-404 (1981) (rejecting analogous
precedent decided under the federal constitution to hold that refusal of state authorities
to fund abortions for indigent women violated the state constitution's penumbral 'guarantee
of privacy).
49. Since Hondroulis was decided, its holding that the state constitution protects
rights of privacy in the autonomy sense has been cited and relied upon in other decisions
involving patients' right to refuse unwanted medical treatment. See Rajnowski v. Saint
Patrick's Hospital, 564 So. 2d 671, 681 (La. 1990) (Dennis, J., concurring in denial of
rehearing); Roberson v. Provident House, 559 So. 2d 838, 845 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1990)
(Barry, J. dissenting). However, as of this writing, no case yet appears to have extended
the analysis of Hondroulis. to autonomy rights of other types.
50. Moresi v. State of La., Through the Dept. of Wildlife and Fisheries, No. 90-C-
0205 (La. Sept. 6, 1990) (1990 WL 130051, 1990 Lexis 1808) [hereinafter Moresi].
51. Id. at 21 (citing Hargrave, The Declaration of Rights of the Louisiana Constitution
of 1974, 35 La. L. Rev. 1, 21 (1974)). The argument that section 5 might apply to private
actors was occassionally mentioned before Moresi. See, e.g., Parish National Bank v.
Lane, 397 So. 2d 1282, 1285 n.7 (La. 1981); St. Julien v. South Central Bell Telephone
Co., 433 So. 2d 847, 851 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1983). In none of these cases, however, did
the court indicate any view on the issue.
52. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403
U.S. 388, 91 S. Ct. 1999 (1971), cited at Moresi, No. 90-C-0205 slip op. at 22.
1990]
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
Shipyards, Inc.," in which the fourth circuit denied that the state con-
stitution grants employees a right to refuse lie detector examinations
required by their employers. So too perhaps with respect to random or
mass drug tests imposed by employers or other non-governmental en-
tities . 4 Moreover, the prospect of a damages recovery, which Moresi
also supports, will likely serve as further inducement for individuals to
assert these rights.
Though the particular violation alleged in Moresi involved the "search
and seizure" rather than the "autonomy" aspects of the state consti-
tutional right of privacy, the court did cite Hondroulis with approval"
and there is no apparent reason why the court's conclusions regarding
private causes of action and the application of section 5 to non-gov-
ernmental parties should not apply to autonomy rights as well. If so,
Hondroulis and Moresi may ultimately come to be seen as marking a
watershed in the constitutional history of Louisiana.
Equal Protection Under the State Constitution: Is Sibley's Third
Category Distinguishable From Federal "Rational Basis" Review?
The guarantee of equal treatment in the Louisiana Declaration of
Rights, Louisiana Constitution article I, section .3,56 differs markedly
from the terse federal guarantee of "equal protection of the laws,"1
57
both in its language and in the purposes of its framers. 5 For these
reasons, the Louisiana Supreme Court held in Sibley v. Board of Su-
53. 521 So. 2d 481 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1988). Ballaron based its decision on a veiw
that such tests did not amount to an actionable invasion of privacy rather than on any
explicit holding that section 5 applied only to state actors.
54. Compare Luck v. Southern Pacific Transportation Co., 218 Cal. App. 3d 1, 218
Cal App. 3d 1492B, 267 Cal. Rptr. 618 (Cal. Ct. App. 1st Dist. 1990) (petition for cert.
filed August 28, 1990) (California constitution protects privacy interests from infringement
by non-governmental entities; precludes private employer from requiring mass drug testing
of employees); Semore v. Pool, 217 Cal. App. 3d 1087, 266 Cal. Rptr. 280 (Cal. Ct.
App. 4th Dist. 1990) and cases cited therein.
55. Moresi, No. 90-C-0205 slip op. at 20 (La. Sept 6, 1990).
56. La. Const. art. I, § 3 provides as follows:
§ 3. Right to Individual Dignity
Section 3. No person shall be denied the equal protection of the laws. No law
shall discriminate against a person because of race or religious ideas, beliefs,
or affiliations. No law shall arbitrarily, capriciously, or unreasonably discriminate
against a person because of birth, age, sex, culture, physical condition, or
political ideas or affiliations. Slavery and involuntary servitude are prohibited,
except in the latter case as punishment for crime.
57. "No State shall . .. deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection
of the laws." U.S. Const., amend. XIV, § 1.
58. On the drafting history and purposes of this section, see generally Hargrave,
supra note 29, at 6-10; Jenkins, The Declaration of Rights, 21 Loy. L. Rev. 9, 16-19
(1975),.
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pervisors of Louisiana State University59 that the state provision must
be interpreted independently of federal equal protection jurisprudence
and the "tier" framework of analysis that was developed under that
federal guarantee. 60 As articulated in Sibley, the proper approach to
analysis of the state constitutional guarantee of equality is also tripartite
in form, but'differs significantly from the federal model in its content:
Article I, Section 3 commands the courts to decline en-
forcement of a legislative classification of individuals in three
different situations: (1) When the law classifies individuals by
race or religious beliefs, it shall be repudiated completely; (2)
When the statute classifies persons on the basis of birth, age,
sex, culture, physical condition, or political ideas or affiliations,
its enforcement shall be refused unless the state or other advocate
of the classification shows that the classification has a reasonable
basis; (3) When the law classifies individuals on any other basis,
it shall be rejected whenever a member of a disadvantaged class
shows that it does not suitably further any appropriate state
interest. 61
During the years since Sibley was decided, however, Louisiana courts
have experienced difficulty in consistently applying the analysis an-
nounced in that case, and in differentiating it from the federal "tier"
approach. 62
During the last two terms, the Louisiana courts have continued to
struggle with the issue of how claims of violation of the state consti-
tutional right of equality-particularly equality claims of the third type
identified in Sibley, i.e. those not based on any of the classifications
59. 477 So. 2d 1094 (La. 1985).
60. According to the traditional federal analysis, equal protection challenges to gov-
ernment action are decided according to one of three standards, depending on the type
of right or distinction at issue. Most government activities are presumed constitutional
and will be upheld unless "a challenging party [can] prove the challenged action to be
completely unrelated to any legitimate governmental objective" ["rational basis" review].
But where government activities infringe on fundamental constitutional rights or distinguish
between individuals on the basis of a "suspect" classification such as race or religion,
"government action is not presumed to be constitutional, and will not be upheld by the
Court unless shown to be necessarily related to a compelling state interest" ["strict
scrutiny" review]. Finally, government activities which classify on other bases, such as
gender, will be reviewed according to an "intermediate" standard according to which a
court "will uphold government conduct if it is substantially related to an important
governmental interest." Sibley, 477 So. 2d at 1105, and cases cited. See generally J.
Nowack, R. Rotunda & J. Young, Constitutional Law, § 14.3, at 528-42 (3d ed. 1986).
61. Sibley, 477 So. 2d at 1107-08 (footnotes omitted).
62. For an overview and analysis of the first three years experience under Sibley,
see generally Comment, Equal Protection-The Louisiana Experience in Departing From
Generally Accepted Federal Analysis, 49 La. L. Rev. 903 (1989).
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expressly enumerated in section 3-should be resolved. Many courts have
strictly followed the approach set forth in Sibley for analyzing claims
of this type, placing the burden of production and persuasion on the
opponent of the challenged state action but nonetheless subjecting that
state action to a serious and searching scrutiny, beyond that which
typically characterizes federal "rational basis" review. 63 Other courts
have tended to amalgamate the state and federal analyses, holding that
the two standards "are quite similar," at least where no enumerated or
suspect classification or fundamental right is at issue. 4 In Pierre v.
Administrator, Louisiana Office of Employment Security,6" the Louisiana
63. See, e.g., Whitnell v. Menville, 540 So. 2d 304, 311 .(La. 1989) (remanding case
so that, among other things, plaintiff would be given the opportunity to show that the
three year prescriptive period against physicians "does not suitably further any appropriate
state interest"); Winston v. Orleans Parish School Board, 545 So. 2d 1174, 1178-79 (La.
App. 4th Cir.), writ denied, 550 So. 2d 631 (1989) (holding that plaintiff had failed to
show that the school board's refusal to give job security to school cafeteria workers
despite granting it to other school workers did not suitably further the state's appropriate
interest in avoiding long-term liability for expenses which the federal government might
in the future cease to subsidize); LaMark v. NME Hospitals, Inc., 542 So. 2d 753, 754-
56 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1989) (holding that single statutory cap on all medical malpractice
claims arising out of a particular event was not a classification based on "physical
condition," and that plaintiffs had failed to show that it did not suitably further the
state's appropriate interest in ensuring the availability and affordability of medical care).
Other decisions have reached what appear to be correct results according to the Sibley
analysis without extensive discussion of just how its standards are to be applied. See,
e.g., Williams v. Kushner, 549 So. 2d 294 (La. 1989) (avoiding an unconstitutional
differentiation between litigants with medical malpractice claims pending against state
defendants and litigants with similar claims pending against private defendants by reforming
La. R.S. 40:1229.43 (Supp. 1990) to exempt future medical expenses from the statutory
damage cap for pending as well as future claims, and thus to conform with La. R.S.
40:1299.39 (Supp. 1990)); Edwards v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co., 552 So. 2d 699, 702-03
(La. App. 3d Cir. 1989), writ denied, 556 So. 2d 61 (1990) (rule denying all workers
compensation benefits for any week in which claimant received unemployment benefits
suitably furthered state's legitimate pecuniary interests); Accountants' Ass'n of Louisiana
v. State, 533 So. 2d 1251, 1256 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1988) (plaintiff produced "no evidence"
that the statutory limits on activities of unlicensed accountants does not tend to accomplish
the state's objective of protecting the public).
64. Miller v. State Civil Service Comm'n, 540 So. 2d 482, 486 (La. App. 1st Cir.
1989), holding that rule denying additional salary credit for experience gained outside
Louisiana while giving credit to those with experience within the state violated neither
the federal nor the state guarantees of equality. After determining that the rule did not
infringe on the fundamental right of interstate travel, the court had no trouble concluding
that it would pass muster under the federal "rational basis" test. The court then concluded,
without extensive analysis, that the same result would obtain under the state provision.
Id. at 486. See also, to the same effect, Bridley v. Alton Ochsner Medical Found. Hosp.,
532 So: 2d 905 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1988), discussed infra at notes 74-76.
65. 553 So. 2d 442 (La. 1989), holding that an amendment to the Louisiana Em-
ployment Security Law, La. R.S. 23:1601(2) (1985), which had the effect of awarding
benefits to certain claimants who had previously filed what were at the time invalid claims
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Supreme Court apparently joined this trend, taking a long and unfor-
tunate step toward blurring the distinction between the federal and state
constitutional standards by saying that state equality claims not based
on any enumerated category should be analyzed in a manner "essentially
the same" as that applied under federal minimal scrutiny, "rational
basis" review. 66
There are, of course, good reasons why analogies between state and
federal constitutional standards should be clearly drawn where appro-
priate. Divergence between state and federal courts in their respective
analyses of basic constitutional rights can create additional uncertainty
for officials charged with the duty to conform their actions to the
commands of both charters, can result in duplication of judicial effort
without noticeable improvement in the quality of the resulting analysis,
and can cause at least the appearance of unprincipled decisionmaking
on the part of one or both courts.67 Moreover, the unique role which
the United States Supreme Court enjoys in our polity-as the one body
with the institutional prestige and national scope to enable it to assume
leadership in articulating a common ,moral and legal basis for the na-
tion-should entitle to great respect the analytic approaches it has de-
veloped to articulate and explain the scope and meaning of basic rights. 8
In addition, this tendency to rely on federal approaches may also reflect
the psychology and training of lawyers. Lawyers and judges are all well
versed in federal equal protection analysis; the basics of "rational basis"
scrutiny and "suspect classes" are deeply ingrained. Thus, it is not
while denying such benefits to otherwise similarly situated claimants who had not previously
filed such invalid claims, was unconstitutional under both the federal and state equality
guarantees.
66. As the court noted in Pierre:
Since the classification at issue does not differentiate on the basis of race or
religious beliefs, nor on the basis of birth, age, sex, culture, physical condition
or political ideas or affiliations, Sibley provides:
[Ilt shall be rejected whenever a member of a disadvantaged class shows that
it does not suitably further any appropriate state interest.
Under the U.S. Constitution, the legislative classification must be rationally
related to a legitimate state purpose, a standard of review that is essentially the
same as Louisiana's where no fundamental right or suspect classification is
involved.
553 So. 2d at 447 (citations omitted).
67. The recognition of problems such as these has been at the heart of the challenges
which have begun to be raised to the recent "new federalism" trend of independent
analysis of state constitutions. See, e.g., Maltz, False Prophet-Justice Brennan and the
Theory of State Constitutional Law, 15 Hastings Const. L.Q. 429 (1988); Maltz, The
Dark Side of State Court Activism, 63 Tex. L. Rev. 995 (1985); Hudnut, State Constitutions
and Individual Rights: The Case for Judicial Restraint, 63 Denver U.L. Rev. 85 (1985).
68. See, e.g., Sager, Foreword: State Courts and the Strategic Space Between the
Norms and Rules of Constitutional Law, 63 Tex. L. Rev. 959, 960-62 (1985).
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surprising that even commentators who are committed to expansive
protection tend, when approaching equality issues under the novel lan-
guage of the state constitution, to see the problem in terms of the
traditional federal categories and to regard the federal analysis as ex-
pressing the only possible modalities of discussion. 69
Nevertheless, this reliance on federal jurisprudence to interpret the
Louisiana constitutional right of equal treatment, however understand-
able, remains misplaced. The unique language of the state guarantee of
"individual dignity" was adopted intentionally by its framers, with the
specific purpose of providing expansive protection for equality interests
independent of and beyond the protections provided by the federal
Constitution. As the court in Sibley noted, a proposal to conform the
state guarantee of equality to the protections given by the federal four-
teenth amendment was explicitly defeated by the Louisiana Constitutional
Convention.7 1 Moreover, any extensive reliance on federal analysis would
fail to afford sufficient deference to Sibley and the concerns which
motivated the decision and rationale in that case. 7 The opinion of the
court in Sibley was quite insistent both in its perception that the state
constitution provides greater protections than does the federal Consti-
tution, and in its rejection of the federal "three-tier" framework of
69. See, for example, Spaht, Lorio, Picou, Samuel & Swaim, The New Forced Heirship
Legislation: A Regrettable "Revolution", 50 La. L. Rev. 409, 422-31 (1990), arguing that,
since the state's new forced heirship legislation sets up categories based on "age," one
of the categories enumerated in section 3, the statute must be subjected to state consti-
tutional review according to a standard approximating the federal "intermediate" level
of scrutiny. The unspoken assumption is that the federal cases have established the range
and categories of analysis, and that all that a more protective state guarantee can add
is to require that a particular discrimination be analyzed at a different "place" along
that federally determined range. In contrast, it appears that Sibley attempted to do more,
to set up a sui generis system of review according to a single standard-"suitability" to
an "appropriate" state interest-that would not necessarily have anything to do with
federal analyses.
70. See generally Hargrave, supra note 29 at 6-10.
71. 6 Records of the Louisiana Constitutional Convention of 1973, Convention Tran-
scripts at 1022-30, discussed in Sibley v. Bd. of Supervisors, 477 So. 2d 1094, 1107-08
(La. 1985).
72: The supreme court was closely divided in Sibley, with the justices splitting four
to three on the crucial issue of whether the state equality guarantee should be interpreted
differently than its federal cognate. 477 So. 2d at 1110 (Justice Watson concurring with
the three-justice opinion of the court on this point); id. at 1110-14 (Justices Calogero,
Marcus and Blanche, dissenting). And with the departure of Justice Dixon, one of the
original Sibley majority, from the bench, there may be speculation that the court may
reconsider the Sibley analysis. Nevertheless, it remains that the commitment to independent
analysis that was made in Sibley has been consistently reaffirmed by the court in subsequent
cases, without any overt indication of any intention to return to the heavily criticized
federal analysis. See, e.g., cases cited at supra note 63; Kirk v. State, 526 So. 2d 223
(La. 1988); Crier v. Whitecloud, 496 So. 2d 305 (La. 1986).
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equal protection analysis. 7 The Sibley court noted accurately that the
federal approach often proved inflexible and ill-suited to the myriad
and closely balanced factual circumstances of equal protection chal-
lenges, 74 that it had come under increasing academic attack, 7 and that
even the federal Supreme Court had begun to abandon that approach
in some cases. 76 Certainly Sibley provides no warrant for any assumption
that the federal and state analyses should share more than superficial
and accidental similarities.
The problems which Sibley saw as inherent in the federal analysis
are particularly acute with respect to classifications receiving only "min-
imal" levels of federal scrutiny, in part because the federal courts have
been unable to come up with any consistent application of that standard.
As the Sibley court noted, such federal "rational basis" review, though
"minimal in theory, has on many occasions "turned out to'be non-
existent in practice, ' 77 construed to require no real showing by the
proponent of the government classification under attack. Rather, federal
courts have at times been all too willing to presume a rational reason
or factual basis for the challenged government action.78 On other oc-
casions, as Sibley also noted, federal courts have applied this same rubric
of "rational basis" review to what has been in fact a much more
searching kind of scrutiny.79 In contrast, Sibley's express language re-
quires that even unenumerated classifications should always undergo a
meaningful scrutiny. While opponents of such classifications bear the
burden of production and persuasion to show that an appropriate state
interest is not suitably furthered, such review is-or at least should be-
no rubber stamp. 0
73. 477 So. 2d at 1105-09.
74. Id. at 1105-06, noting the federal Supreme Court's ad hoc efforts to inject much-
needed flexibility into the federal scheme by cobbling up the "intermediate" level of
scrutiny, by de facto alteration of the operative standard in particular cases and, on
occasion, by abandoning its standard analysis altogether.
75. Id. at 1106 and n.19, citing Shaman, Cracks in the Structure: the Coming
Breakdown of Levels of Scrutiny, 45 Ohio St. L.J. 161, 182-83 (1984); Seeburger, The
Muddle of the Middle Tier: The Coming Crisis in Equal Protection, 48 Missouri L. Rev.
587 (1983); Hutchinson, More Substantive Equal Protection: A Note on Plyler v. Doe,
1982 Sup. Ct. Rev. 167 (1982); and Gunther, In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a
Changing Concept: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 Harv. L. Rev. 1 (1972).
76. 477 So. 2d at 1105-06, and cases cited therein.
77. Id. at 1105.
78. See, e.g., Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456, 101 S. Ct.
715 (1981); Williamson v. Lee Optical, 348 U.S. 483, 75 S. Ct. 461 (1955).
79. 477 So. 2d at 1105 and n.17 (citing Zobel v. Williams, 457 U.S. 55, 102 S. Ct.
2309 (1982); Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422, 102 S. Ct. 1148 (1982);
Department of Agriculture v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 93 S. Ct. 2821 (1973)).
80. 477 So. 2d at 1107-08.
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The distinction thus drawn between the analysis of unenumerated
categories under the state equality guarantee and "rational basis" analysis
under the federal constitution is not merely formal or semantic. On the
contrary, the failure to observe the distinction may well have been
outcome determinative in some recent cases. For example, in Bridley v.
Alton Ochsner Medical Foundation Hospital,'8 the court held, first, that
since the distinction set up by the challenged statute did not fall within
any of the categories enumerated in section 3, "the provision is presumed
constitutional,' '2 and, second, that there was no need to remand the
case for further evidence on whether the statute "reasonably" furthers
a "legitimate" state interest "because of the minimal level of scrutiny
involved.''3 Such conclusions might well be compatible with federal
"rational basis" analysis, at least in its less rigorous form. But considered
under the more searching standards that Sibley requires to be applied
to state equality claims, both the result and the language of Bridley
appear incorrect.u
To be sure, the supreme court's recent comments in Pierre need
not-and, I would argue, should not-be read as necessarily establishing
an analogy between section 3 and the most permissive line of federal
"rational basis" review. On the contrary, the cases cited by the court
in Pierre to illustrate the federal standard are precisely those which
embody the strictest version of federal equal protection scrutiny.85 And
it may well be that the Sibley standard and the strictest version of
federal rational basis review would lead to similar results in most cases.
Nevertheless, given the ambiguity of the federal "rational basis" stan-
dard, any such reference is bound to be unclear at best, and at worst
sufficiently misleading to result in further decisions like that in Bridley.
It would thus seem preferable for the courts of this state to continue
to interpret section 3 according to its own terms, and to avoid easy
but potentially misleading analogies to federal jurisprudence interpreting
a very different federal guarantee.
STATE GOVERNMENT: STRUCTURE AND OPERATIONS
During the past two terms, the Louisiana courts have also rendered
a number of decisions regarding the structure and operation of state
81. 532 So. 2d 905 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1988), holding that the statutory requirement
that medical malpractice claims must be submitted'to a medical review panel violates
neither the federal nor the state equal protection guarantees.
82. Id. at 907.
83. Id. at 908.
84. See also, to similar effect, Miller v. State Civil Service Comm'n, 540 So. 2d 482,
486 (La. App. Ist Cir. 1989), discussed at supra note 57.
85. Pierre v. Administrator, La. Office of Employment Security, 553 So. 2d 442,
447 (citing City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S 432, 105 S. Ct. 3249
(1985), and Zobel v. Williams, 457 U.S. 55, 102 S. Ct. 2309 (1982)).
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government and the allocation of power among its branches. Prominent
among these has been the ongoing litigation over the power of the state
Board of Ethics for Elected Officials and its Supervisory Committee on
Campaign Finance Disclosure, a body appointed in part by the legislative
branch, to undertake the assertedly executive function of initiating civil
proceedings against one alleged to have violated the Campaign Finance
Disclosure Act. This is an issue which is still unresolved as this article
goes to press, 6 and will therefore be left for future discussion. Other
decisions have involved such disparate matters as judicial tenure, 7 the
limits on execution against the state,"8 and the three dollar auto license
fee. 9 Nonetheless, the most interesting development in this area of state
constitutional law was surely the supreme court's recent declaration that
the 1988 restructuring of the Louisiana workers compensation system
impermissibly derogated from the exclusive original jurisdiction of the
district courts, and was thus unconstitutional.
86. The district court initially denied defendants' motions based upon the asserted
unconstitutionality of the enforcement system established by the Campaign Finance Dis-
closure Act, La. R.S. 18:1481-1532 (Supp. 1990). The first circuit reversed, holding that
such an exercise of executive powers by the Committee did violate state constitutional
provisions mandating separation of powers between the executive and legislative branches,
La. Const. art. II, §§ 1 & 2, and vesting the governor with exclusive authority to execute
the laws. La. Const art. IV, § 5(A). State, Bd. of Ethics v. Green, 540 So. 2d 1185 (La.
App. 1st Cir. 1989). As of this writing, the supreme court has issued two opinions in
the case, both of which were subsequently vacated. The first opinion would have affirmed
the circuit court, agreeing (by a bare four to three majority, which included Justices
Marcus, Watson, and Cole, and Judge Pike Hall, sitting in place of Justice Lemmon)
that the system violated separation of powers. State, Bd. of Ethics v. Green, 545 So. 2d
1031 (La. 1989). The second opinion would have reversed the circuit court, holding (again
by a four to three majority, now including Chief Justice Dixon and Justices Lemmon,
Dennis and Calogero) that no violation of separation of powers had occurred. State, Bd.
of Ethics v. Green, 559 So. 2d 480 (La. 1990). The final opinion will doubtless be rendered
after Chief Justice Dixon's successor is determined.
87. Giepert v. Wingerter, 529 So. 2d 1389 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1988), holding that
La. Const. art. V, § 23(a) protects the right of any judge already serving at the time
when the 1974 constitution became effective to continue in office until the mandatory
retirement age of 75 established by the 1921 constitution; subsequent reelection after 1974
does not subject such a judge to the lower mandatory retirement age of 70 set by the.
1974 constitution.
88. See, e.g., Foster v. State, 560 So. 2d 502 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1990), holding that,
where state appropriates only sufficient funds to pay the principle amount of a judgment
rendered against it, the state's sovereign immunity, embodied at La. Const. art. XII, §
10, bars the judgment creditor from bringing a subsequent action to recover interest and
court costs. See also, to similar effect, Bruno v. City of New Orleans, 724 F. Supp. 1222
(E.D. La. 1989), holding that a judgment creditor in a federal civil rights action is also
barred from executing that judgment against the city.
89. Williams v. State, 538 So. 2d 193 (La. 1989), holding that La. Const. art. VII,
§ 5, which limits motor vehicle license fees, precludes the state from imposing an additional
"handling fee" on license applications..
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Worker's Compensation and the District Courts: A Jurisdictional
Limit on Administrative Adjudication
Until 1983, employees who wished to press workers compensation
claims in Louisiana were required to do so by filing civil suits in district
court. Revisions enacted in that year changed this system, by creating
an administrative agency, the Office of Worker's Compensation Ad-
ministration ("OWCA"), to handle initial processing of compensation
claims and by requiring injured employees to initially file their claims
with the director of the OWCA for a recommendation as to how the
claim should be resolved. 9° Under the 1983 amendments, these recom-
mendations remained advisory only; employees retained the right to bring
an action de novo in district court if either side rejected the director's
recommendation. In 1988, the legislature amended the compensation
system yet again, this time eliminating the role of the district courts
except in matters of enforcement. 9' According to the new system, the
task of conducting hearings on and initially determining disputed com-
pensation claims fell not to district judges but rather exclusively to a
newly established group of nine administrative hearing officers-executive
branch employees-subject only to a right of appeal on the record to
the circuit courts of appeal. 92
In Moore v. Roemer,93 the Louisiana Supreme Court held, without
dissent, 94 that this system of administrative adjudication of compensation
claims violated the state constitution. Though plaintiffs in Moore raised
several grounds for such a finding of unconstitutionality,95 the supreme
90. 1983 La. Acts 1st ex. sess. No. 1. For analysis of the effects of the 1983
amendments see generally Turner v. Maryland Casualty Co., 518 So. 2d 1011, 1014-15
(La. 1988).
91. 1988 La. Acts No. 938. By reforming the workers compensation system to vest
exclusive original jurisdiction in an administrative agency, rather than in the courts, the
legislature responded to longstanding criticism of the Louisiana system and brought this
state's system into line with that of the vast majority of other states. See generally W.
Malone & H. Johnson, Workers' Compensation § 37, at 51-57, in 13 Louisiana Civil
Law Treatise (2d ed. 1980).
92. La. R.S. 23:1310.1-.5 (1985). As originally enacted, 1988 La. Acts No. 938 also
set up a system of internal administrative appeals from initial determinations to a panel
comprised of 3 hearing officers. An appeal could then be taken from this appeals panel
to the circuit courts of appeal. The administrative appeals panel was abolished by 1989
La. Acts No. 454 § 9 which provided for direct appeals from the OWC hearing to the
circuit court of appeal, effective January 1, 1990.
93. 567 So. 2d 75 (1990), affirming Moore v. Roemer, 560 So. 2d 927 (La. App.
1st Cir. 1990).
94. Justice Dennis was the only justice who did not join in the opinion of the court.
He concurred and will assign reasons, which have not, as of this writing, appeared.
95. In addition to the grounds ruled on, plaintiffs also asserted in the supreme court
that the 1988 amendments to the workers compensation system violated: La. Const. art.
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court ruled on only one. It held that the constitution's express mandate
in article, V, section 16(A) that "district court[s] shall have original
jurisdiction of all civil ... matters" s precluded the legislature from
depriving district courts of power to hear such claims. The court re-
affirmed that the standard for finding legislative enactments unconsti-
tutional is a strict one.97 Nevertheless it found the decision in Moore
compelled by the plain terms of the state constitution, construed by a
straightforward syllogism: the legislature may not divest district courts
of jurisdiction mandated by the state constitution, which includes original
jurisdiction over "civil matters"; worker's compensation claims are "civil
matters"; therefore no statute may vest any administrative organ with
exclusive power bindingly to determine such claims in the first instance, 9s
at least in the absence of de novo review in the district courts. Since
the drafting history of section 16(A) appears to strongly support the
court's major premise, 99 the real question was the constitutional definition
II, § 1 (separation of powers); art. V, § 1 (vesting the judicial power of the state in the
supreme court, courts of appeal, district courts and other courts authorized by that article);
art. V, § 22 (requiring election of judges); and art. I, § 22 (requiring courts to be open
to provide adequate remedies for injured persons), as well as the due process and equal
protection clauses of the federal and state constitutions, U.S. Const. amend. XIV & La.
Const. art. I, §§ 2 & 3. Moore, 567 So. 2d at 78 n.3. Other related arguments raised
before the court of appeal also included that the workers compensation amendment
impermissibly conferred oiginal jurisdiction on appellate courts and deprived the district
courts of exclusive jurisdiction over claims in which the state or a political subdivision
is a defendant, in violation of La. Const. art. V, §§ 10 & 16(A). Moore, 560 So. 2d at
931.
96. La. Const. art. V, § 16(A). That provision provides in full as follows:
§ 16. District Courts; Jurisdiction
(A) Original Jurisdiction. Except as otherwise authorized by this constitution,
a district court shall have original jurisdiction of all civil and criminal matters.
It shall have exclusive original jurisdiction of felony cases and of cases involving
title to immovable property; the right to office or other public position; civil
or political rights; probate and succession matters; the state, a political cor-
poration, or political subdivisions, or a succession, as a defendant; and the
appointment of receivers or liquidators for corporations or partnerships.
(B) Appellate Jurisdiction. A district court shall have appellate jurisdiction as
provided by law.
97. Moore, 567 So. 2d at 78, citing Louisiana Recovery District v. All Taxpayers,
Property Owners, and Citizens of Louisiana, 529 So. 2d 384 (La. 1988), and other cases.
For a brief discussion of the standards announced in that case see Devlin, Developments
in the Law, 1987-1988, Louisiana Constitutional Law, 49 La. L. Rev. 395, 406-20 (1988).
98. Moore, 567 So. 2d at 78-80.
99. The court noted that the Judiciary Committee of the 1973 Constitutional Con-
vention specifically rejected language from its working draft that would have permitted
the legislature to make exceptions to the original jurisdiction of the district courts. Instead,
as drafted and ratified, 16(A) provides that jurisdiction can be removed from the district
courts only as "otherwise authorized by this constitution .... Moore, 567 So. 2d at 79
n.5. While such constitutional authorization for limiting the district courts' jurisdiction
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of "civil matters." While the court's conclusions on this point are not
beyond dispute, it did marshal an impressive array of arguments-based
on the constitution's language,' °° structure,10' and drafting history 1°2-
to support its conclusion that the constitutional term should be construed
broadly to encompass all matters not "criminal" in nature, including
compensation.
Potentially more troubling, however, was the supreme court's han-
dling of defendant's argument that the legislature may exercise its police
may exist with respect to some classes of cases-see, e.g., La. Const art. V, § 18, providing
that the jurisdiction of juvenile and family courts shall be determined by the legislature
"notwithstanding any contrary provision of section 16;" art. IV, § 21, vesting original
jurisdiction to regulate common carriers and public utilities in the Public Service Com-
mission; art. X, § 12, vesting original jurisdiction to "hear and decide all removal and
disciplinary cases" in the State and City Civil Service Commissions-no similar provision
appears to authorize removal of jurisdiction over compensation claims. See generally,
Hargrave, The Judiciary Article of the Louisiana Constitution of 1974, 37 La. L. Rev.
765, 811-13 (1977).
100. Moore, 567 So. 2d at 79, arguing that the linguistic juxtaposition of "civil" and
"criminal" in section 16(A) indicates an intent by its drafters to exhaust the universe of
judicially cognizable issues. As the court further noted, this same terminology, opposing
"civil" and "criminal" matters, is used elsewhere in Article V for the purpose of describing
the jurisdiction of the Louisiana Supreme Court to review questions of law and fact. La.
Const. art. V. § 5(C). Since it appears that section 5(C) was intended to provide for all
matters that might come before the state supreme court, it supports the conclusion that
the same words, when used in section 16(A), should be given a similarly universal
interpretation. See also, to the same effect, 6 Records of the Louisiana Constitutional
Convention of 1973, Convention Transcripts 796 (1977) (Remarks of Delegate Dennery,
noting that matters within the purview of the Public Service Commission would be "civil
matters" under the meaning of section 16).
The court also noted the use in section 16(A) of the general term "matters" rather
than the narrower "cases," a term' which was apparently intended to insure that the
district courts' jurisdiction would extend to all types of legal issues, even those not
presented in traditional adversarial form. Moore, 567 So. 2d at 79 n.6. See Hargrave,
supra note 99 at 809-10. This point appears to refute the argument raised by Chief Judge
Covington, dissenting from the court of appeals decision in this case, that compensation
claims do not present traditional disputed "cause of action" and thus may fall outside
of section 16(A). Moore v. Roemer, 560 So. 2d 927, 941 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1990).
101. Moore, 567 So. 2d at 79, noting that it is difficult to argue that administrative
matters constitute a separate "non-judicial" category of matters under the language of
section 16(A), since the constitution does make specific reference to the jurisdiction of
certain administrative bodies such as the Civil Service and Public Service Commissions,
and specifically exempts matters within their respective purviews from the original juris-
diction of the district courts. See supra note 92.
102. Moore, 567 So. 2d at 79-80, noting that workers compensation was, in 1974,
generally considered to be a civil matter over which the district courts had jurisdiction,
and that section 16(A) was adopted by the convention with little debate and without any
intention by the framers to alter the original jurisdiction of the district courts as it existed
at that time. 6 Records of the Louisiana Constitutional Convention of 1973, Convention




power to endow individuals with additional "public law" rights beyond
those known to common law or the Civil Code,, and that where it does
so it may condition its largesse by restricting beneficiaries to an ad-
ministrative mechanism for vindication of those novel rights.'03 While
the court acknowledged that the compensation remedy is a novel one
which the legislature has discretion to confer or to eliminate entirely,
it did not agree that this implied, in this case, that the legislature also
possessed the lesser. included power to limit beneficiaries to only an
administrative remedy. The court distinguished between "public" and
"private" rights, and held that compensation claims fall within the latter
category since such litigation "adjudicates a dispute between private
parties and results in a money judgment affecting only those parties"' ' 4
and since government is not ordinarily involved in such suits, either as
a party or as the administrator of the compensation system. 05 At least
as to matters falling within the definition of "private rights," the leg-
islature's authority is limited. Novel "private" rights, once conferred,
become subject to constitutional mandates regarding the court's adju-
dicatory jurisdiction.'06
As applied to worker's compensation, the Moore court's conclusion
that "private" rather than "public" rights were at stake in that case
is certainly plausible. However, the definition of "public" rights which
the Louisiana Supreme Court applied appears to be narrower than the
definition used by some other jurisdictions. For example, in a recent
case raising issues somewhat parallel to those in Moore, the United
States Supreme Court reaffirmed that the category of "public rights"
which Congress may assign to administrative tribunals for determination
extends, for purposes of the federal Constitution, beyond that category
of cases in which the government is directly involved and would include
''a seemingly 'private' right that is so closely integrated into a public
regulatory scheme as to be a matter appropriate for agency resolution
103. The compensation remedy is generally considered to be in the nature of social
welfare legislation and is to be sharply distinguished from any traditional tort remedy
which might otherwise be available under the facts of a particular claim. See generally
W. Malone & H. Johnson, Workers' Compensation §§ 32-33, in 13 Louisiana Civil Law
Treatise (2d ed. 1980).
104. Moore, 567 So. 2d at 81.
105. Id., distinguishing, for example, the unemployment insurance system, which gov-
ernment directly operates. Of course, where the injured claimant is a government employee,
government is involved, in its private capacity.
106. Moore, 567 So. 2d at 80. This argument somewhat parallels that made in the
procedural due process context, under both the state and the federal constitutions. Due
process guarantees, in themselves, create no protectable liberty or property interests.
However, once such interests have been created by some other mechanism, due process
rights limit the mechanisms by which persons can be deprived of those interests.
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with limited involvement by the ... judiciary."' 0 7 To be sure, such
precedents are only persuasive, and further elucidation of the concept
of "public rights" in Louisiana-and of what kinds of issues may be
left for administrative rather than judicial determination in this state-
will doubtless be provided by future cases. However, it may be that a
too narrow definition of "public rights" and a too great insistence on
the role of courts in all circumstances where private interests are opposed
could, in the future pose, an obstacle to efficient administration of
important government programs without any real increase in the security
of individuals' rights.1°
In the wake of Moore, Article V, sections 10 and 16(A) of the
Louisiana Constitution were amended so as to permit the legislature to
explicitly withdraw worker's compensation claims from the original ju-
risdiction of the district courts and authorize direct appeal to the courts
of appeal from administrative determinations of such claims.1 9 By its
express terms, this amendment addresses only the jurisdictional objections
107. Granfinanciera, S.A. v. Nordberg, 109 S. Ct. 2782, 2797 (1989), and cases cited.
The Court in Granfinanciera held that even under its broader definition, the proceeding
at issue in that case, the right of a bankruptcy trustee to recover fraudulent conveyances,
was a "private" rather than a "public" right, and that Congress therefore could not cut
off a defendant's right to a jury in such actions by assigning its resolution to a non-
Article III court.
108. The court in Moore appears to have been somewhat sensitive to these concerns,
distinguishing for example, the state environmental laws, over which administrative tribunals
rather than courts presently exercise original jurisdiction. Moore, 567 So. 2d at 80-81.
Though the court stopped short of endorsing cases which have upheld such arrangements
in such contexts, Moore should not be read as any wholesale rejection of the principle
that administrative agencies may be vested with exclusive original adjudication to determine
claims arising out of at least some class of public rights, however defined.
109. 1990 La. Acts No. 1098, §§ 10, 16. The affected sections of the state constitution
will now appear, in pertinent part, as follows:
Sec. 10. Courts of Appeal; Jurisdiction
(A) Jurisdiction. Except as otherwise provided by this constitution, a court
of appeal has appellate jurisdiction of (1) all civil matters, including direct review
of administrative agency determinations in worker's compensation matters as
heretofore or hereafter provided by law. ...
(B) Scope of Review. Except as limited to questions of law by this constitution,
or as provided by law in the review of administrative agency determinations,
appellate jurisdiction of a court of appeal extends to law and facts. In the
review of an administrative agency determination in a worker's compensation
matter, a court of appeal may render judgment as provided by law, or, in the
interest of justice, remand the matter to the administrative agency for further
proceedings ....
Sec. 16. District Courts: Jurisdiction
(A) Original Jurisdiction. (1) Except as otherwise authorized by this constitution
or except as heretofore or hereafter provided by law for administrative agency
determinations in worker's compensation matters, a district court shall have
original jurisdiction of all civil and criminal matters ....
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expressly ruled on in Moore; it does not address the other arguments-
based on separation of powers, the state constitution's guarantee of
open courts and adequate remedies, and the state and federal guarantees
of equal protection and due process-which were raised against the 1988
amendments but left unresolved in the Moore litigation." 0 Thus, even
if the amendment is ratified, the administrative system established by
the 1988 amendments may be subject to further constitutional challenge.
Nonetheless, if challenged, the compensation system established in 1988
should now be upheld. As Chief Judge Covington argued in his dissent
from the first circuit's decision in Moore, strong rebuttals can be raised
against the challenger's separation of powers, open courts, equal pro-
tection and due process arguments."' In addition, a strong argument
can be made that the recent constitutional amendment should be con-
strued broadly, to insulate a worker's compensation system like that
established by the 1988 amendments from state constitutional challenges
of any kind. The explanation of the proposed amendment that was
placed on the official ballot and presented to the voters was phrased
not solely in terms of amending the jurisdiction of the state courts, but
also in terms of legitimating the worker's compensation system estab-
lished in 1988.112 To the extent that the intentions of the ratifiers of
constitutional amendments should guide interpretation and that the prop-
osition actually put to the ratifiers is the best guide to their intentions,
a compelling argument will thus be available that the amendment should
be construed to overcome all objections to the worker's compensation
system it was so clearly intended to restore.
110. See supra note 95.
Ill. Moore v. Roemer, 560 So. 2d 927, 936-39 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1990) (Covington,
C.J., dissenting).
112. 1990 La. Acts No. 1098, after setting forth the proposed changes in article V,
sections 10 and 16, supra note 109, provides for the wording of the official ballot as
follows:
Section 3. Be it further resolved that on the official ballot to be used at said
election there shall be printed a proposition, upon which the electors of the
state shall be permitted to vote FOR or AGAINST, to amend the Constitution
of Louisiana, which proposition shall read as follows:
To provide that the trial of worker's compensation cases may be decided by
administrative hearing officers, rather than the district court, that appeals from
administrative agency decisions on worker's compensation cases shall be heard
by the courts of appeal, and to validate such processes already in operation
pursuant to law. (Amends Article V, Section 10(A) and 16(A)).
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